put forward by the defendants in domestic and European courts regarding actionable crimes and who holds responsibility for them; and third, the narratives set out by ECtHR judges in both the verdicts and their dissenting opinions regarding these Soviet-era offenses. All of these narratives and interpretations are important transitional justice documents. This chapter focuses on three ECtHR decisions, and the way they reflect the understanding of past crimes shared by the judges, the prosecutors, and the defense counsels. These external actors label certain actions as crimes (including imprescriptible crimes) and by so doing, they change or consolidate the historical narrative in the country from which the case originated.
In particular, this chapter argues that these court cases illustrate areas in which domestic and international actors contest memory. They demonstrate that the ECtHR judges can have a wide variety of opinions on whether acts perpetrated during Soviet times on the 2 territory of the three Baltic states are punishable after 1991. The ECtHR judges come from diverse educational and legal cultural backgrounds, with potential implications on their understanding of 20 th century European history. The ECtHR is increasingly playing an important role in the validation of key historical narratives in post-communist Europe, with unexpected consequences for the definition of key crimes and the way these definitions are contested The judiciary's legal interpretation and understanding of international human rights law is crucial in criminal justice cases that entail a conflict between the duty to prosecute heinous crimes and the prohibition of ex-post facto punishment. 2 To illustrate the way that these changes in definition and legal remedy come about, the chapter engages both the legal reasoning put forward by domestic courts before the cases reach the ECtHR, and the legal reasoning and verdict of the ECtHR on these cases.
At present, the ECtHR includes 47 judges nominated by the states parties to the European Convention of Human Rights. At least 22 judges come from former communist countries and the FSU, including one judge from Russia. A case that comes before the Chamber of the ECtHR is heard by a bench composed of the President of the Section to which the case is assigned, the national judge (the judge with the nationality of the state against which the application is lodged) and five other judges. In exceptional cases, a case may be referred or relinquished to the Grand Chamber. In such a situation, the bench is composed of a larger panel of 17 judges.
In the Baltic republics in particular, and the Former Soviet Union (FSU) more generally, the transition from the repressive communist regimes to more democratic forms of government catalyzed new perspectives on national history. The power struggle between the old and new elites produced different narratives, some shared by the former oppressors, others championed by the former oppressed. The transition also created debates about the significance of key historical events and persons and, more broadly, about right and wrong.
In this context, the domestic courts have become critical forums in which different versions of the communist history have prevailed at times through the venue of legal cases.
Occasionally, some of the cases related to communist crimes have then moved to international courts, when individuals believed that due process or legal safeguards were not met in their national jurisdiction. As a result, the ECtHR has become an important "dispenser of transitional justice." 3 The "narratives" about the communist past that the ECtHR has heard, Importantly, versions of history could also be appropriated for varied political ends. 4 In this chapter, 'historical politics' refers to the political use and abuse of history. An examination of the way in which memories of violent periods are interpreted and used reveals the active appropriation and the use of the past as a basis on which to take prosecutorial action. 5 All cases considered here concerned retrospective justice, and required the courts to define and debate the communist crimes to see if they amounted to imprescriptible crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide). While retrospective justice is important for transitional justice, since it comprises the key points that underpin it (justice and truth), it is legally complex. The court can be challenged when asked to look at provisions permitting the law to work backwards to address egregious rights violations. The Baltic states illustrate the ways in which transitional justice, legal culture, historical politics, and retrospective justice can come together. Ultimately, these cases point to changes in the way international 4 courts interpret communist crimes as imprescriptible crimes. International courts can thus render rulings that impose a different view of history, in contradiction to the domestic courts'
interpretation. This chapter highlights the manner in which the ECtHR has shaped legal and political developments and historical narratives in the Baltic states.
The Baltic states and their Soviet past
Further to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Agreement concluded between the Soviets and the Germans, the Baltic states were militarily occupied and annexed by the Soviet Union in 1940.
The states became part of the Soviet Union de facto, although most Western countries refused to recognize this annexation as legal. 6 The Soviet occupying forces initiated, inter alia, two main repression campaigns in the Baltic states.
During the first occupation of 1940-1941 the Soviets carried out mass deportations in all three countries. In Estonia, it is estimated that 9,267 persons were deported (the number does not include victims of repression or of extra-judicial executions). In Latvia 15, 424 persons were deported, and in Lithuania 17,500. 7 Other forms of widespread repression extended to all segments of the Baltic populations, including the political and economic elites, and racial and religious minorities, such as Jews, Roma and Jehovah's Witnesses. This first repression campaign is often seen as evidence of the Soviet Union's intent to destroy Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 8 During the first twelve years of the second occupation of 1944-1991 further deportations were carried out against local guerrilla movements (the so-called 'forest brethren'), the wealthy peasants (the kulaks), and various religious minorities. 9 It is estimated that 20,702 Estonians, 42,231 Latvians, and 78,735 Lithuanians were deported during this second wave. 10 The number of casualties is perhaps even higher, but cannot be estimated in 
Retrospective justice through the Baltic court cases
Measures supporting retrospective justice are an important subject of study.
Retrospective justice ideally aims at ascertaining the truth and achieving justice, yet not all truth and justice policies may automatically contribute to such a process, and the links between truth and justice are varied and require consideration. 17 Retrospective justice has its roots in the old criminal law principle that the law should not work backwards. This principle was enshrined in Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 18 The Convention was formulated in 1950, when its drafters responded to previous developments in Nazi
Germany and other parts of Europe that allowed authoritarian regimes to pass retroactive laws that made criminal, without warning, acts that had been lawful under the previous democratic regime. 19 These developments also resonated after World War II, when the international community developed the Nuremberg principles, further to the Charter of the International Military Tribunal of 8 August 1945, which permitted individuals to be prosecuted for crimes against humanity that had not been criminal according to the Nazi legislation and practice in force at the time when those acts had been committed. 20 In general, Article 7 prohibits the legislature and the courts from creating or extending the existing law to criminalize acts or omissions that were not illegal at the time of their commission or omission, or to increase a penalty retroactively. It also expects the law to be clearly defined. 21 
Article 7 reads:
No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed. This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according to the general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. 22 Criminal law, which is based on individual guilt and is used to confront past injustice, has important retrospective justice components pertaining to legal certainty and clarity that 8 will be explored in this piece through court cases. As will become clear in the next section, both the requirement for individual culpability and the reservation that individuals shall not be punished retrospectively mean that certain forms of retrospective justice might sit uneasily with the legal guarantees enshrined in Article 7.
The Nuremberg Trials drew the attention of the international legal community to principles of natural justice, which were eventually embraced by University of Heidelberg law professor Gustav Radbruch, after he rejected the idea that the horrendous acts of the 
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These three cases have been selected for this analysis based on key characteristics that lie at the core of legal arguments: the nature of the crime, the identity of the perpetrator(s) and of the victim(s), as well as the tensions between diverging historical narratives and retrospective justice goals that infringe procedural guarantees and human rights.
9
The crimes of concern for these cases were war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide. Of special note is the definition and treatment of the crime of genocide. The 1948
United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide defined that crime very narrowly. 25 The Convention refers to protected national, ethnical, racial, and religious groups, but in one of the three Baltic cases examined in this chapter, the ECtHR was asked to extend the definition of genocide to include national political groups.
The confirmation by the ECtHR of such an extension did not occur. The chapter examines the way crimes were defined and understood by the state prosecutor, defense counsel and the national courts, and whether the ECtHR upheld the state's narrative in its rulings. Such an investigation is pertinent to transitional justice because it demonstrates that redress through the courts can validate or invalidate the official historical narrative of a country.
Estonia
The Estonian International Commission for the Investigation of Crimes against Humanity (EICICAH) was created in 1998. 26 Its mandate was to establish the crimes against This case is important for thinking about historical memory and politics because these historical events, and accountability for them, rest at the heart of the legal rationale for retrospective justice. The events took place under Soviet occupation, whose legality has been disputed by Estonia and Russia. As such, Kolk and Kislyiy also speaks to larger transitional justice issues in the FSU, because the case confirms the illegality of the Soviet occupation, which was not limited only to the Baltic states, but extended to other FSU republics.
Critically, the ECtHR recognized the illegal actions of the occupying power. In so doing, this application of retrospective justice upheld the victims' dignity over other rights specified in The case of Alfons Noviks, a high-ranking officer in the secret police, presents a rare example of a former KGB leader being charged and convicted successfully. He was held responsible for committing genocide against the Latvian people, understood as the complete 14 or partial destruction of a group. 38 The Noviks case acknowledged that common problems for the three Baltic states in pursuing retrospective justice were the absence of witnesses, the passing away of the perpetrators, and/or the lack of material evidence. For Latvia, getting closer to the truth was difficult also because many answers lay potentially hidden in the still unavailable Russian archives. 39 The Russian leaders proved uncooperative in providing information to facilitate accountability for communist crimes. 40 The were presented with impossible choices that blurred the distinction between moral and legal duties. 43 As a result, the ECtHR's observations concerning the alliances that the villagers could have possibly forged with either the Nazi and/or the Soviet occupiers become hollow. 44 In other words, the identification of who is the victim and who is the perpetrator of crimes against humanity becomes a complex issue. Indeed, in Kononov, the ECtHR approved a standard requiring that offences be defined in law with sufficient accessibility and foreseeability. 53 Yet in Vasiliauskas, apart from the dissenting judges, historical politics could not find support in the ECtHR.
The divergent majority and minority positions adopted by the judges reveal the divisions even within the ECtHR in defining genocide. before the Chamber and Grand Chamber (see Table 1 ). In this case, the dominant (Western)
European historical narrative, and the Russian position towards its country's contribution in the fight against fascism, was challenged. In fact, Kolk and Kislyiy laid the groundwork for the ECtHR to recognize the illegality of the Soviet occupation of Latvia. It did not do so, but the ECtHR held that the Nuremberg principles apply equally to the Allies and Axis powers alike.
Insert Table 1 around here
The differences arise in the way that genocide is defined, as seen in Vasiliauskas.
There are several issues at stake. One, taken from Vasiliauskas, is whether the Lithuanian definition of genocide that includes national political groups will lead to a change on the part of the ECtHR in its approach to genocide. At present this is a minority view. I argue that through these and other cases, the ECtHR is shaping legal and political developments in the FSU. These three cases demonstrate that the ECtHR has become an important "dispenser of transitional justice," and a critical European forum in which various versions of history prevail at different times. However, the diversity of the ECtHR judges and differences in court practices mean that consistency across cases will not always prevail.
Importantly, a court composed of 47 judges will mean differences in approach to the interpretation of the law and in the understanding of peculiar state histories. All three cases saw important contributions from judges representing either former communist states or the FSU, such as Judges Ziemele and Kūris whose dissent strongly criticized a majority position that they saw as narrow, shortsighted, and unable to embrace a wider definition of genocide.
The Dutch ECtHR Judge, Egbert Myjer, cannot be ignored. His contribution reflected and supported the Russian position on the Allies' critical role in fighting fascism during World
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War II. This view, as shown in this chapter, is being revised, with the help of the ECtHR. In sum, the decisions depended on the judges' understanding of past crimes, and whether the action qualified as crimes according to domestic and international law.
For the FSU and transitional justice, this points to the selective manner in which some histories are repressed and other histories are validated, highlighting the instrumental use of the past to forge a new national narrative through prosecutorial action. Court petitions and cases challenge narratives underscoring the Soviet heroism against fascism, and by doing so, in the view of the Russian officials, they distort World War II reality. In this way, the Baltic cases are not just about the Baltics. These cases reverberate through other FSU states, in particular Russia, as they legitimize or reject certain narratives about the past that are critical for state-building.
Notes:
1 No new data were created in this study.
2 Raluca Grosescu and Agata Fijalkowski, "Retrospective Justice and Legal Culture," in Justice, Memory and
